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Individual Rights Under a System of Dual 
Sovereignty: The Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
Stephen R. McAllister* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a teacher of both the required, first-year course in federal 
constitutional law and an upper-level course on state constitutional law, I 
want to focus on the relationship between the Federal Constitution and 
the state constitutions in this Article for the 2010 Kansas Law Review 
Symposium.  I will use the particular example of the right to keep and 
bear arms, recognized in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and in provisions in forty-four state constitutions, to highlight a few 
points about the relationship between these two constitutional regimes.  
My overall goal is to address briefly some of the common 
misconceptions I have encountered regarding the relationship between, 
and the roles of, the federal and state constitutions. 
I identify and briefly explain three fundamental propositions about 
the relationship between the federal and state constitutions, using a few 
examples relevant to my home state of Kansas to illustrate the general 
propositions.  The Article ultimately applies those general principles to 
the particular context of the individual right to possess and use firearms.  
I speculate about how gun rights may develop in the future under state 
constitutions now that the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Second Amendment are an active part of this area of the law.  My 
conclusion is that state supreme courts and state constitutions may play a 
prominent role in the development of gun rights, though state-based 
rights may be significantly limited by acts of Congress that regulate 
firearms and preempt any contrary state law, including state 
constitutions.  In this instance, at least, the entity that will most influence 
the scope of state constitutional rights is likely to be Congress, not the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
                                                     
* Professor of Law at the University of Kansas. 
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II. THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Proposition #1: If Provisions of Federal Law and a State 
Constitution Conflict, Federal Law Prevails 
The starting point for any discussion of the relationship between the 
U.S. and the state constitutions is the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of 
the Federal Constitution, which provides: 
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.1 
This clause “make[s] clear—in explicit terms—that federal law has 
primacy over state law, including state constitutions, when there is a 
conflict between any federal law (constitutional, statutory, or even 
regulatory) and state law.”2  There are numerous examples of the 
Supreme Court of the United States invalidating provisions in state 
constitutions that are preempted by contrary federal law.3 
The Supremacy Clause is directly relevant to a recent proposal in the 
Kansas legislature, a proposal that also was considered in the 2010 
legislative session, but which failed to garner the two-thirds majority 
necessary to put a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot.  In 
2010, several legislators sponsored a proposed constitutional amendment 
that, if adopted, would have declared that no Kansan can be compelled to 
purchase health insurance.4  This proposal was a direct response to the 
federal health care reform legislation, which includes an “individual 
                                                     
 1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 2. RANDY J. HOLLAND, STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JEFFRY S. SUTTON, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE 91–92 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down a state 
constitutional amendment as a violation of equal protection principles); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837–38 (1995) (striking down a state constitutional amendment imposing 
term limits on a state’s representatives in Congress, finding such term limits to conflict with the U.S. 
Constitution’s explicit qualifications for such representatives); cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 456–70 (1991) (construing the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act not to reach 
state judges in order to avoid preempting state constitutional mandatory-retirement-age provision). 
 4. See H.R. Con. Res. 5032, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010); S. Con. Res. 1626, 83d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010). 
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mandate” for citizens not otherwise covered by health insurance to 
purchase such coverage or else pay a penalty or tax.5  The 2010 Kansas 
proposal would have added a new article 16 to the Kansas Constitution, 
providing in pertinent part as follows: 
Article 16.—HEALTH CARE 
§1. Health care. (a) To preserve the freedom of Kansans to provide for 
their health care: 
(1) A law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, 
employer or health care provider to participate in any health care 
system or purchase health insurance. 
(2) A person or employer may pay directly for lawful health care 
services and shall not be required to pay penalties or fines for paying 
directly for lawful health care services.  A health care provider may 
accept direct payment for lawful health care services and shall not be 
required to pay penalties or fines for accepting direct payment from a 
person or employer for lawful health care services. 
(b) Subject to reasonable and necessary rules that do not substantially 
limit a person’s options, the purchase or sale of health insurance in 
private health care systems shall not be prohibited by law or rule.6 
The Kansas proposal also included an “explanatory statement” that 
was to be included with the measure on the ballot.  That “explanation” 
included the following statement: “A vote for this proposition would 
preserve constitutionally the right of a person, employer or health care 
provider to be free from laws or rules compelling participation in any 
health care system . . . .”7  In 2011, essentially the same proposal has 
been reintroduced in the Kansas legislature.8 
                                                     
 5. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 
242–49 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091; 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).  Two courts have upheld the 
individual mandate as constitutional.  See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 
2010 WL 4860299, at *11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. 
Supp. 2d 882, 893–95 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  Two other district courts have struck down the individual 
mandate as unconstitutional.  See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *40–41 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 6. Kan. H.R. Con. Res. 5032; Kan. S. Con. Res. 1626. 
 7. Kan. H.R. Con. Res. 5032 § 2; Kan. S. Con. Res. 1626 § 2. 
 8. See John Hanna, Landwehr Revisits Plan to Block Health Care Law, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 
21, 2011, available at http://www.kansas.com/2011/01/21/1683912/landwehr-revisits-plan-to-
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An important question is whether such an amendment to the Kansas 
Constitution will have any legal effect.  Despite the assertion in the 
“explanatory statement” about preserving “constitutionally the right” not 
to be compelled to participate in a health care system,9 the proposed 
Kansas constitutional amendment cannot override lawfully exercised 
federal power.10  Indeed, it is clear that, if adopted, such an amendment 
can have no effect on the constitutionality or application of the federal 
health care law to Kansas and to Kansans.  If Congress has the power to 
enact the individual health insurance mandate,11 then no state 
constitutional amendment, or state statute, can preclude the operation of 
such a federal law on a state’s citizens. 
Thus, although the constitutional amendment may have value as an 
expression of Kansans’ unhappiness and disagreement with federal law,12 
it can have no legal effect in the federal arena if Congress had the power 
to enact the federal law.  Such an amendment would, however, be 
binding with respect to state law, meaning that it certainly can preclude 
the Kansas legislature from compelling Kansans to participate in health 
insurance or health care programs.  That result may be sufficient from 
the proponents’ perspective, coupled with the amendment’s role as a 
symbolic statement about the opinion of a majority of Kansans on the 
federal health care law. 
On the other hand, because the amendment would be binding on the 
Kansas legislature, that body should at least be cognizant of the fact that 
if the amendment were adopted and the legislature later determined that 
it might be good policy to require certain individuals to purchase some 
form of health insurance, the amendment would preclude the state 
legislature from acting, absent another state constitutional amendment to 
repeal the effect of the first one.  Maybe the Kansas legislature will never 
                                                                                                                       
block.html (reporting that Kansas House Representative Brenda Landwehr has “said she’ll push a 
‘Health Care Freedom Amendment’ even though a majority of states, including Kansas, are pursuing 
legal challenges to the new federal law.  She said she’ll introduce a new version of the measure by 
early February.  She expects it to mirror proposals with the same name from last year, which would 
prohibit the state from requiring individuals or businesses to buy health insurance.”). 
 9. Kan. H.R. Con. Res. 5032 § 2; Kan. S. Con. Res. 1626 § 2. 
 10. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 11. This, of course, is the point of real contention.  See cases cited supra note 5. 
 12. Kansas would not be the only state to express such an opinion through a legal enactment of 
no real effect.  A number of states put constitutional amendments or statutory initiatives on the ballot 
in 2010.  See, e.g., S.J. Res. 59, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010); H.R. 1764, 95th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.R. Con. Res. 2014, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009).  
All of the foregoing legislative actions have been approved.  See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation 
and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 
13, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906. 
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deem it proper to require anyone to purchase health insurance, in which 
case this may be a moot point.  Nonetheless, it is at least worth 
considering any potential—and perhaps unintended—consequences of 
amending the Kansas Constitution with respect to constraining the 
Kansas legislature and Kansas officials such as the Governor or attorney 
general.  State constitutions always restrict the exercise of state power, 
even if they cannot prevent the application of valid federal law to a state 
and its citizens. 
To reiterate, the Supremacy Clause and numerous Supreme Court 
decisions make it indisputably clear that if there is a conflict between 
valid federal law and a state constitution, the federal law prevails.13  The 
Tenth Amendment, which declares that “powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States,”14 does not provide any comfort for state 
constitutional provisions that conflict with valid federal law.  If a federal 
law is validly based on a power delegated to the United States—such as 
the power to regulate interstate commerce15 or the power to tax16—then 
there is no power to be “reserved” to the states, and the Tenth 
Amendment is inapplicable. 
B. Proposition #2: State Constitutions May Provide Greater Protection 
of Individual Rights than Does the U.S. Constitution 
It is a relatively straightforward—and indisputable—proposition that 
state constitutions may accord greater protections of individual rights 
than the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to provide.17  This 
principle is based on several factors, including (1) that the Federal 
Constitution always has been viewed as a “floor” of rights, not a 
“ceiling”; (2) that state constitutions may include express rights that are 
not included at all, or at least not in the same fashion, in the U.S. 
Constitution; and (3) that the fundamental nature of our federal system 
allows for variations among the states in this respect.18  Thus, if the U.S. 
                                                     
 13. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 15. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 16. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 17. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] state is free as a matter of its own 
law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon 
federal constitutional standards.”); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (noting that states 
have the “power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal 
Constitution”). 
 18. See Dorothy Toth Beasley, Essay, Federalism and the Protection of Individual Rights: The 
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Constitution does not protect particular speech or religious practices, 
prevent the government from taking private property for certain 
purposes, prevent particular police conduct, guarantee education rights to 
children, provide for same-sex marriage, or guarantee a woman’s right to 
terminate a pregnancy, nothing in American law or tradition precludes 
the states from recognizing any and all of these rights under their state 
constitutions. 
The examples of this proposition are numerous, so I will highlight 
only two from Kansas by way of illustration.  The first example involves 
education.  The Supreme Court of the United States held almost four 
decades ago that there is no federal constitutional “right to education” 
because there is no express provision in the U.S. Constitution granting 
such a right and education is not a “fundamental right.”19  The Court has 
shown no inclination to revisit or revise that holding, but the state courts 
have been far from inactive in the area of education.  Instead, the 
financing of public education has been perhaps one of the most active 
areas of state constitutional law over the past few decades. 
That certainly was true of Kansas during the past ten years.  In state 
court litigation challenging the Kansas funding system for K–12 schools, 
the Kansas Supreme Court expressly addressed educational rights under 
the Kansas Constitution.  In sharp contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the 
Kansas Constitution has an article—article VI—explicitly devoted to 
education.  Section 1 of that article provides that the “legislature shall 
provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific 
improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools.”20  Section 
6(b) further provides that the “legislature shall make suitable provision 
for finance of the educational interests of the state.”21 
In the Montoy v. State litigation,22 the Kansas Supreme Court relied 
solely on these state constitutional provisions to conclude that the school 
funding system then in place failed to comply with state constitutional 
requirements.  The court stated that the funding system did not violate 
the federal Equal Protection Clause.23  Instead, the court concluded that 
the Kansas school funding system contravened article VI of the Kansas 
                                                                                                                       
American State Constitutional Perspective, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 695–96 (1995). 
 19. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–37 (1973). 
 20. KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
 21. Id. art. VI, § 6(b). 
 22. There are four decisions in Montoy, often referred to as Montoy I, II, III, and IV: Montoy v. 
State (Montoy I), 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003); Montoy v. State (Montoy II), 120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005); 
Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005); Montoy v. State (Montoy IV), 138 P.3d 755 
(Kan. 2006). 
 23. Montoy II, 120 P.3d at 308. 
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Constitution.24  This is a clear example—by no means unique to 
Kansas25—of a state constitution providing significantly greater rights 
than does the Federal Constitution.  Furthermore, a majority of the 
Kansas Supreme Court, at least prior to the untimely passing of Chief 
Justice Davis, has endorsed the proposition that education is a 
fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution,26 which is indisputably 
not the case under the U.S. Constitution.27 
A second example is the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, 
recognized in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution28 and in 
sections 5 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights.29  In the 
context of juvenile proceedings, forty years ago the U.S. Supreme Court 
held—in an admittedly somewhat confusing set of opinions—that 
juveniles do not have a federal constitutional right to a jury trial.30  For 
many years, the Kansas Supreme Court took the same view under the 
Kansas Constitution.31  But, in 2008, in In re L.M., the Kansas Supreme 
Court reversed course and held that juveniles have a constitutional right 
to a jury trial under both the federal and Kansas constitutions.32 
The holding in L.M., that there is a federal constitutional right to a 
jury trial in juvenile cases, is open to serious debate, not least because the 
                                                     
 24. See id. at 308–10. 
 25. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K–12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in 
the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1025–26 (2006); Jeffrey S. Sutton, 
Essay, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1963, 1973–74 (2008). 
 26. Montoy II, 120 P.3d at 311 (Beier, J., concurring) (“I disagree with the holding . . . that 
education is not a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution.  I believe it is.”); id. at 318 
(Luckert, J., concurring) (“I would find that education is a fundamental right under the Kansas 
Constitution.”); Montoy IV, 138 P.3d at 766 (Rosen, J., concurring) (“Every child in Kansas has a 
fundamental right to an education guaranteed by the Kansas Constitution.”). 
 27. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 28. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
 29. “The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.”  KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5.  “In all 
prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.”  Id. § 10. 
 30. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
 31. See, e.g., In re L.A., 21 P.3d 952, 963 (Kan. 2001) (holding that there is no federal or state 
constitutional right to a trial by jury in proceedings under the Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code); 
Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20, 22 (Kan. 1984) (same), abrogated by In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 
2008). 
 32. 186 P.3d at 170–72.  An in-depth examination of the L.M. decision is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  For a thorough analysis of the court’s opinion, as well as a discussion of how a 
juvenile’s right to jury trial should operate, see generally Andrew Treaster, Note, Juveniles in 
Kansas Have a Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial.  Now What?  Making Sense of In re L.M., 57 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1275 (2009). 
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only U.S. Supreme Court precedent on point holds to the contrary.33  But 
even assuming for the sake of argument both that the Kansas Supreme 
Court is wrong on that point and that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
rejecting such a right remains valid federal precedent, L.M. is an 
interesting example of the proposition I am discussing in this section.  
Indeed, even were it absolutely clear that there is no federal right to a 
jury trial in juvenile cases, nothing in the U.S. Constitution precludes 
Kansas from recognizing such a right under the Kansas Constitution, as 
the court did in L.M. 
There may in fact be much stronger or more defensible reasons to 
recognize such a right under state law rather than federal law.  For 
example, one of the Kansas constitutional jury-trial provisions—on 
which the concurrence in L.M. relied but on which the majority curiously 
did not34—speaks in emphatic terms not directly mirrored in the Federal 
Constitution: “The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.”35  
Furthermore, under the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas Supreme Court 
can take account of factors unique to Kansas, such as (1) state 
constitutional language that differs significantly from federal 
constitutional provisions;36 (2) the history and evolution of the Kansas 
juvenile justice system, which arguably has come more and more to 
resemble the adult criminal justice system—including lessening the 
emphasis on juvenile rehabilitation and increasing the emphasis on 
retribution and punishment;37 and (3) the practical impact such a ruling 
will have on the juvenile justice system in Kansas, including the effect 
on prosecutors, the defense bar, and the trial courts.38 
                                                     
 33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  Although acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has never revisited or revised its decision in McKeiver, and that no state supreme court has 
ever held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial in juvenile cases—a proposition that the 
L.M. majority oddly characterized as “not find[ing] total support from the courts in some of our 
sister states”—the L.M. majority nonetheless remained “undaunted in [its] belief that juveniles are 
entitled to the right to a jury trial guaranteed to all citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.”  In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 171 (emphasis added). 
 34. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 172–73 (Luckert, J., concurring) (“I concur in the majority’s 
conclusion that L.M. has a constitutional right to trial by jury, but I base this conclusion on the rights 
guaranteed by § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights rather than the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which are relied upon 
by the majority.”). 
 35. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5. 
 36. See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 153 (“When the language of the state constitutional 
guarantee differs materially from its federal counterpart, the state courts have an additional reason 
for construing their constitutions differently.”). 
 37. See generally In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (noting that the juvenile justice system is now 
patterned after the adult criminal system). 
 38. See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 139 (noting that state courts can “allow local 
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Moreover, a rule under the Kansas Constitution affects only Kansas, 
leaving other states free to interpret their jury-trial rights as they deem 
appropriate under state law and local conditions.  A Sixth Amendment 
ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, in marked contrast, would establish a 
baseline requirement for all states, which may be one reason why, at 
least in some instances, the U.S. Supreme Court may be reluctant to 
announce or recognize new federal constitutional rights or to interpret 
federal individual-rights provisions aggressively in favor of greater 
rights.  Lastly, by also relying on the state constitution as an independent 
basis for recognizing a jury-trial right in L.M., the Kansas Supreme Court 
precluded Kansas from appealing that court’s debatable holding under 
federal law to the U.S. Supreme Court.39  I am not suggesting that the 
Kansas Supreme Court had any tactical strategy in this regard but, rather, 
want to highlight an important point about the relationship between the 
federal and state constitutions: not only may state supreme courts 
interpret state constitutions more expansively than the U.S. Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution, but such decisions are 
immune from U.S. Supreme Court review, so long as they are based 
clearly and independently on state law.40 
Of course, state supreme courts often follow federal law when 
interpreting analogous provisions of state constitutions.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court has described its interpretation of the Kansas 
Constitution in this regard as follows: 
While we can recognize a broader right under the Kansas Constitution, 
we have not explicitly done so in our [double jeopardy] cases.  
Generally, provisions of the Kansas Constitution which are similar to 
the Constitution of the United States have been applied in a similar 
manner.  No reason has been suggested why we should do otherwise in 
the area of double jeopardy.41 
                                                                                                                       
conditions . . . to affect their interpretation of a constitutional guarantee”). 
 39. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (stating that the Supreme Court will not 
review state court decisions raising issues of federal law if the state courts clearly rely on 
independent and adequate state-law grounds for their ultimate decision). 
 40. See id. 
 41. State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 77 (Kan. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see also State 
v. Morris, 880 P.2d 1244, 1254–56 (Kan. 1994) (stating that the right to counsel under section 10 of 
the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights provides the same protection as the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments of Federal Constitution); State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818, 823 (Kan. 1993) (noting that 
the scope of section 15 of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights is identical to the Fourth 
Amendment); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kan. City, Kan. Port Auth., 636 P.2d 760, 777 (Kan. 1981) 
(explaining that sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights are given the same 
effect as the Fourteenth Amendment).  The Kansas Supreme Court also has indicated that, in an 
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As the Kansas cases make clear—and many similar cases can be found in 
just about every state—the proposition that a state constitution may 
provide greater rights than does the Federal Constitution does not 
necessarily mean that a state supreme court will interpret any given state 
constitutional provision or guarantee to do so.42 
C. Proposition #3: State Constitutions in Theory Also May Provide Less 
Protection than the U.S. Constitution, but in Such Circumstances, 
They Are Rendered Ineffective by Federal Preemption 
A perhaps trickier conceptual proposition, but one that is equally as 
strong and accurate as the first two propositions identified above, is the 
notion that state constitutions also can provide less protection of a 
particular right than the Federal Constitution provides.  This is in a sense 
a theoretical proposition because a state constitutional interpretation 
giving lesser rights than the U.S. Constitution cannot have legal effect so 
long as the federal constitutional “floor” remains in effect.43  But this 
point highlights that on some very important and potentially 
controversial issues, the state constitutions may enshrine different value 
judgments than those found in the U.S. Constitution, and not always in 
favor of recognizing greater rights. 
Two controversial examples will illustrate this point.  First, many 
states, including Kansas, define “marriage” as “constituted by one man 
and one woman only.”44  Indeed, the Kansas Constitution expressly 
states that “[a]ll other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public 
policy of this state and are void.”45  Thus, “[n]o relationship, other than a  
                                                                                                                       
appropriate case, Kansas constitutional protections in the criminal procedure area might have a more 
expansive meaning than the analogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Scott, 
183 P.3d 801, 830 (Kan. 2008) (rejecting a state constitutional challenge to the Kansas death penalty 
statute, but observing that “[o]ur decision today should not be construed to preclude future 
interpretation of § 9 [of Kansas’s Bill of Rights, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment,] when 
considering the proportionality of a criminal sentence.  In such a circumstance, we are free to further 
consider the historical record and decide whether § 9 should be interpreted in a manner which 
deviates from that given to the Eighth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court.”). 
 42. There is, however, an interesting and quite plausible argument that the tradition of 
interpreting state constitutions by reference to interpretations of analogous provisions in the Federal 
Constitution may have it backwards.  For an interesting article proposing that perhaps the Supreme 
Court of the United States should be looking to state supreme court interpretations of state 
constitutions in deciding what various provisions in the U.S. Constitution mean, see generally Joseph 
Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011). 
 43. See Beasley, supra note 18, at 695. 
 44. KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(a). 
 45. Id. 
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marriage, shall be recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the 
rights or incidents of marriage.”46 
In August 2010, a federal district court held that prohibiting same-
sex marriages violates the U.S. Constitution.47  That case is now on 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit48 and 
undoubtedly will be pursued to the Supreme Court, no matter how the 
Ninth Circuit rules.  It is entirely possible that the U.S. Supreme Court 
ultimately will review this case or another case raising the same issues.  
If the Supreme Court were to rule that the Federal Constitution 
recognizes and protects an individual right to marry a person of the same 
sex, then no state—including Kansas—could give legal effect to state 
constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage.49  The result would be 
a situation in which some states clearly desire to provide less 
constitutional protection of individual rights, but the federal 
constitutional “floor” precludes them from giving effect to their 
constitutional orientation or preferences. 
A second example arises in the context of abortion and a woman’s 
right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.  Some states certainly 
would prefer that abortion be illegal in all or virtually all circumstances, 
and they may ultimately express that view in their state laws or 
constitutions.50  But those preferences can be given no more legal effect 
than the Supreme Court’s federal constitutional abortion jurisprudence 
                                                     
 46. Id. art. 15, § 16(b). 
 47. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 48. On January 4, 2011, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court a question 
about the standing of the proponents of the initiative, who are appealing the district court’s ruling 
because state officials did not appeal.  See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 49. See Beasley, supra note 18, at 695. 
 50. Some states, and perhaps even the U.S. Congress, may consider either constitutional 
amendments or legislative enactments that would declare that life begins at conception or 
fertilization.  See, e.g., H.R. 490, 62d Leg., 2011 Sess. (Mont. 2011).  Colorado voters defeated such 
a proposal in November 2010.  See Electa Draper, Amendment 62 “Personhood” Initiative Sinks by 
3–1 Margin, DENV. POST, Nov. 3, 2010, at B2.  But there are ongoing efforts to pursue such 
proposals in a number of states.  See Cheryl Wetzstein, Mississippi Voters Can Decide 
‘Personhood,’ WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at A6.  These efforts are not limited to the state level.  A 
“Life at Conception Act” was introduced in the U.S. Senate on January 25, 2011.  See S. 91, 112th 
Cong. (2011).  Some states already have statutes that declare life begins at conception or 
fertilization.  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1) (2000) (stating that “[t]he life of each human 
being begins at conception”).  One scholar who has surveyed the fifty states concluded that it is 
likely that thirteen states would protect a right to abortion under their state constitution if Roe v. 
Wade were overruled, while thirty-seven states probably would not recognize such a state 
constitutional right.  See generally PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2008) (analyzing abortion rights under all fifty 
state constitutions). 
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allows.  In other words, no state currently can ban or criminalize all 
abortions, although some might prefer that choice as a matter of state 
policy or state constitutional law. 
Only if the Supreme Court were, for example, to overrule Roe v. 
Wade51 and declare that the U.S. Constitution neither creates nor protects 
a woman’s individual right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy 
could these states ever give legal effect to their expressed preferences.  
Of course, deciding which side in the abortion debate provides for 
greater or lesser protection of individual rights depends, I suppose, on 
one’s perspective.  For the pro-choice side, federal law currently 
provides greater protection of women’s rights than some states might 
recognize if they were free to determine the scope of such rights.  For the 
pro-life side, federal law provides less protection for the rights of the 
unborn, and so I assume their view would be that state law could in fact 
provide greater protection of individual rights, if unconstrained by the 
federal constitutional doctrine recognized in Roe and subsequent cases. 
In any event, these two examples are intended to illustrate that there 
may well be circumstances in which at least some states desire to provide 
less protection of certain individual rights than the Federal Constitution 
has been held to require.  Thus, it is perhaps inaccurate to think of state 
constitutional law as necessarily a one-way ratchet, always moving in 
favor of the states recognizing greater individual rights than the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to provide.  The states 
certainly may, in given instances, prefer a very different recognition of 
rights than provided by the Federal Constitution, and those state 
preferences may go in either direction—in favor of greater protection or 
in favor of lesser protection. 
III. APPLYING THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO POSSESS AND USE FIREARMS 
A. Individuals Have a Limited Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the 
Second Amendment, and This Right Applies Against State and Local 
Governments 
For a remarkable 220 years, the Supreme Court never decided the 
question whether the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
recognizes an individual right to own, possess, and use firearms.  The 
Second Amendment’s elliptical language is well-known and has been 
                                                     
 51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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much debated by scholars and others over the years,52 but in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,53 the Supreme Court finally addressed the provision 
head-on.  Heller involved a District of Columbia law that, among other 
things, generally prohibited the possession of handguns in the District 
and required that long guns, such as rifles and shotguns, generally remain 
unloaded and disassembled or disabled by a trigger lock when kept in a 
person’s home.54 
The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment (1) creates an 
individual right to keep and bear arms that is not limited by reference to 
the militia purpose expressly recognized in the amendment and (2) the 
D.C. total ban on common handguns and restrictions on the readiness of 
long guns in the home were unconstitutional.55  Importantly, for state 
constitutional law purposes, the Court issued the following explicit 
caveat: “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is 
not unlimited.”56  The Court pointedly—and without any further 
explanation—cautioned that, 
[a]lthough we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today 
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.57 
The Court did not specify—indeed it expressly declined to specify or 
articulate—a particular test or level of scrutiny for Second Amendment 
challenges.58 
Because Heller involved a federal enclave and thus a “federal” law, 
not a state or local government enactment, it did not resolve the question 
                                                     
 52. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 211–51 (1983) (examining the literal language, proposal and 
ratification, philosophical and historical background, and contemporary understandings of the 
Second Amendment). 
 53. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 54. See id. at 574–75. 
 55. See id. at 586, 595, 630. 
 56. Id. at 626. 
 57. Id. at 626–27. 
 58. The lower courts have been struggling with the test or level of scrutiny ever since Heller 
was decided.  See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678–79 (4th Cir. 2010) (wrestling 
with “the question of how to evaluate [a] Second Amendment challenge” and surveying the 
approaches that are being developed in the circuits following Heller). 
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whether the Second Amendment right recognized there also applies 
against the states and local governments.  The Court resolved that issue 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago,59 with a majority holding that the right 
recognized in Heller applies against the states and local governments.  A 
plurality of four relied on the “incorporation doctrine” developed under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,60 and Justice Thomas 
concurred on the ground that the right applies as a privilege or immunity 
of federal citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.61  McDonald, 
however, does not further define or explain the right that Heller 
recognized, either in terms of its substance or the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges to federal, 
state, or local laws regulating the sale, possession, or use of firearms. 
B. Because the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the 
Second Amendment Does Not Appear to Disturb Various Significant 
Federal Firearms Regulations, State Courts and State Constitutions 
May Be Precluded from Recognizing Greater Gun Rights than the 
Second Amendment Provides 
My goal in this Article is not to explore or debate the wealth of 
materials and arguments that have been brought to bear on Second 
Amendment issues.  Rather, my point is to consider briefly the newly 
recognized federal Second Amendment right of individuals as that right 
relates to state constitutional provisions that recognize rights to possess 
and use firearms.  Indeed, as the table appended to this Article 
demonstrates, forty-four state constitutions expressly recognize and 
protect some form of gun rights.62  Further, it is entirely possible that 
some state supreme courts either already have or in the future will 
interpret their state constitutions to provide greater protection of an 
individual’s right to keep and bear arms than the U.S. Supreme Court 
ultimately decides that the Second Amendment requires.63 
                                                     
 59. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 60. See id. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (“We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”). 
 61. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 62. See Appendix infra Part V.  For a slightly older survey that includes citations to state cases 
interpreting these provisions, see Eugene Volokh, Reference Material, State Constitutional Rights to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 206–07 (2006). 
 63. See, e.g., Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.C. 2009) (holding that a state 
constitutional provision virtually identical to the Second Amendment precluded the state from 
denying the right to keep and bear arms to a nonviolent felon who had lived peacefully and 
committed no further violations of the law for seventeen years since his felony conviction). 
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As the table illustrates, a few state constitutions have language that 
tracks the Second Amendment,64 though it is worth remembering that 
several state constitutional firearms-rights provisions predate the Second 
Amendment,65 and thus it is perhaps the Second Amendment that mimics 
the language of state constitutions, not vice versa.66  In total, forty-four 
state constitutions currently contain a gun-rights provision.67  At least 
thirty state constitutions explicitly refer to a right to keep and bear arms 
in self-defense, variously phrased as defense of “self,” “home,” 
“themselves,” or in other ways.68  A few state constitutions refer to the 
right as relating to the “common defense,”69 and a handful recognize the 
right without specifying any purpose—militia, self-defense, common 
defense, or otherwise.70 
Indeed, some states, such as Kansas, appear to have adopted wording 
to make clear that their state constitutional provision recognizes rights 
separate and apart from any militia purpose or notions, thus granting 
rights much broader than the “collective right” view of the Second 
Amendment, and perhaps even potentially broader than the Second 
Amendment as interpreted in Heller.  For example, in November 2010, 
Kansans overwhelmingly approved an amendment to section 4 of the 
Kansas Bill of Rights.71  Section 4 had provided that “[t]he people have 
the right to bear arms for their defense and security.”72  The 2010 
amendment changed section 4 to state that “[a] person has the right to 
keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, for 
                                                     
 64. The state constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina, and South Carolina track the 
Second Amendment language verbatim, or very nearly so.  The Virginia Constitution reads similarly 
to focus on a militia purpose, but the phrasing is different than the Second Amendment.  See 
Appendix infra Part V. 
 65. This is a point that the majority in Heller made in interpreting the Second Amendment to 
recognize an individual right, rather than solely a collective, militia-related right.  See Dist. of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600–02 (2008). 
 66. That obviously is not the case with respect to Alaska and Hawaii, but it could well be true 
of the Carolina constitutions and the Virginia Constitution, as well as other founding-era state 
constitutions that subsequently have been amended to alter the language by which they recognize 
gun rights. 
 67. See Appendix infra Part V.  Only California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
New York do not have gun-rights provisions in their state constitutions.  See Appendix infra Part V. 
 68. See provisions quoted in Appendix infra Part V. 
 69. Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Tennessee have provisions making this reference.  See 
Appendix infra Part V. 
 70. This small group includes the constitutions of Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
and Rhode Island.  See Appendix infra Part V. 
 71. See Jan Biles, Two Amendments Look to Have Passed, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Nov. 3, 2010, at 
7A. 
 72. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4 (amended in 2010). 
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lawful hunting and recreational use, and for any other lawful purpose.”73  
As the ballot measure explained—or repeated, “[t]he purpose of this 
amendment is to preserve constitutionally the right of a person to keep 
and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for all 
other lawful purposes, including hunting and recreation.”74 
Proponents of the measure stated, for example, that “‘[i]t’s just 
making certain we have an individual, not a collective right to gun 
ownership in Kansas.’”75  One opponent charged that the amendment 
was pointless: “‘The U.S. Supreme Court, . . . in two different decisions 
over the last two years has determined that the 2nd Amendment is 
applicable to the states. . . . This is completely ridiculous and 
unnecessary.’”76  Superficially, the observation that the Second 
Amendment already protects gun rights and thus makes state 
constitutional provisions redundant or unnecessary might seem 
persuasive, but Heller makes clear—if that is the right way to describe a 
decision that specifically fails to articulate a standard for evaluating 
Second Amendment claims—that the right the Court recognizes is far 
from powerful and expansive.77  Indeed, the Heller opinion goes out of 
its way to reassure everyone that a host of federal statutes regulating 
firearms are constitutional.78  Thus, it is not at all clear how much 
substance there is to Second Amendment rights,79 and it may make 
considerable sense for a state constitutional guarantee to be clear and 
explicit, unlike Heller and the Second Amendment.80 
                                                     
 73. S. Con. Res. 1611, 83d Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Kan. 2009). 
 74. Id. § 2. 
 75. Rachel Whitten, Constitutional Ballot Questions Leave It Up for Voters to Decide, 
KANSASREPORTER.ORG, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.kansasreporter.org/legislative/issues/68123.aspx 
(quoting then-State Senator Tim Huelskamp, a current member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives). 
 76. Douglas Kennedy, A Second 2nd Amendment? Kansas Initiative Would Reaffirm Right to 
Bear Arms, FOX NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/09/16/second-2nd-
amendment-kansas-initiative-would-reaffirm-right-bear-arms (quoting Paul Helmke of the Brady 
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence). 
 77. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See, e.g., Anna Stolley Persky, An Unsteady Finger on Gun Control Laws: Despite 2nd 
Amendment Cases, Firearms Codes Are Moving Targets, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 14, 14 (discussing 
various post-Heller Second Amendment challenges and observing that “[w]hile there have been 
challenges throughout the country to local, state and federal gun laws, few have been successful”). 
 80. For Kansas in particular, at least two Kansas Supreme Court decisions have held that 
section 4 of the Kansas Bill of Rights only provides a collective right to bear arms for militia 
purposes, not an individual right.  See City of Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Kan. 
1975); City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905).  One case struck down a gun-control 
ordinance as “unconstitutionally overbroad” without ever mentioning section 4, instead seeming to 
rely on due process principles and apparently concluding that the city ordinance at issue was 
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At the same time, however, the Supremacy Clause—in combination 
with the federal statutes explicitly mentioned and blessed in Heller—
may result in states having limited power to guarantee or provide to their 
citizens gun rights broader than those the Supreme Court recognizes as 
Second Amendment rights.  This is not because the Second Amendment 
itself restricts states from choosing to recognize more expansive gun 
rights.  Under our system of dual sovereignty, federal Bill of Rights 
guarantees are floors of individual-rights guarantees, not ceilings,81 so in 
the absence of any federal statutes in this area, states would be free to 
recognize significantly broader gun rights than the Second Amendment 
may be held to provide. 
The rub, however, is all of those federal statutes that the Heller Court 
expressly approved—though with no explanation.82  To get a sense of the 
federal statutes to which the Court was referring, the best source is the 
amicus curiae brief that the United States filed in Heller.  Remember that 
although the District of Columbia is a unique federal enclave rather than 
a state, the United States was not a party to the case, which was between 
Mr. Heller and the District of Columbia local government.83  
Nonetheless, the United States filed an amicus brief in the case, and the 
Court permitted the Solicitor General of the United States to participate 
extensively in the Heller oral argument.  In light of this fact, it seems 
quite likely that the Heller majority’s references to federal statutes 
regulating firearms were made with the U.S. brief in mind. 
The United States argued that the Second Amendment creates an 
individual right to keep and bear arms, but that the right is limited and 
subject to considerable regulation by Congress.84  Indeed, the brief 
identified four categories of federal statutes regulating firearms, all of 
which the government argued were constitutional even if the Court 
recognized an individual right in the Second Amendment to keep and 
                                                                                                                       
irrational.  See City of Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1150–51 (Kan. 1979).  In the most 
recent Kansas case raising a section 4 claim, the court concluded that a prohibition on concealed 
weapons did not violate the Second Amendment and further reaffirmed the Blaksley precedent that 
section 4 did not preclude concealed-carry regulations.  See State v. Knight, 218 P.3d 1177, 1188–90 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2009).  In light of these cases, it is not at all clear that before its amendment in 2010, 
section 4 of the Kansas Bill of Rights recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, nor 
would the scope of any such right have been at all certain under the pre-2010 version of that 
provision.  Thus, amending section 4 was a logical and potentially important option for those 
Kansans who prefer a strong state constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 
 81. Beasley, supra note 18, at 695. 
 82. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 83. See id. at 575–76. 
 84. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20–21, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-
290), 2008 WL 157201. 
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bear arms: (1) statutes banning particular types of weapons, such as 
machine guns or firearms that can evade metal detectors or x-ray 
machines;85 (2) statutes prohibiting certain persons from possessing 
firearms, such as convicted felons, fugitives from justice, those with 
certain drug convictions, those found mentally incompetent, aliens 
illegally in the U.S., those dishonorably discharged from the armed 
forces, those who have renounced their U.S. citizenship, certain persons 
subject to restraining orders, and those convicted of certain crimes of 
domestic violence;86 (3) statutes prohibiting firearms in certain 
locations, such as federal government facilities, the Capitol and its 
grounds, and aircraft;87 and (4) statutes regulating commercial 
transactions involving firearms, including the manufacture, sale, and 
importation of firearms.88  After reciting these numerous federal statutes, 
the brief noted that the Attorney General had “made clear that the United 
States ‘can and will continue to defend vigorously the constitutionality, 
under the Second Amendment, of all existing federal firearms laws.’”89  
The brief later argued the constitutionality of categories (1), (2), and (4) 
at some length.90 
So long as Congress has considerable power to regulate who may 
possess firearms, where they may possess them, and under what terms 
and conditions they may acquire them, the Supremacy Clause guarantees 
that any such federal statutory restrictions—or administrative 
regulations, such as, for example, those that might be promulgated by the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms or some other agency or 
federal entity at the direction of Congress—trump any state 
                                                     
 85. Id. at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), (p) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). 
 86. Id. at 2–3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)–(9) (2000)). 
 87. Id. at 3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 930 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 
IV 2004); 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1) (2000)). 
 88. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a), (l); 923 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). 
 89. Id. at 3–4 (quoting Brief for the United States in Opposition app. at 1, Emerson v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 907 (2002) (No. 01-8780)). 
 90. See id. at 21–25 (arguing that Congress can ban specific types of firearms); id. at 25–26 
(arguing that Congress can prohibit certain categories of individuals from possessing firearms); id. at 
26–27 (arguing that Congress can regulate commercial transactions involving firearms).  Curiously, 
the U.S. brief did not include a section arguing the constitutionality of category (3)—prohibited 
locations for carrying firearms.  Nonetheless, the Heller majority seemed to endorse that category, as 
well as expand its application to schools.  See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) 
(“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools . . . .”).  Notably, the U.S. brief did not mention schools 
as locations where firearms could validly be prohibited, though this is not surprising given the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of the Gun Free School Zones Act in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995). 
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constitutional provisions to the contrary.91  Thus, felons prohibited by 
federal law from possessing firearms can find no comfort in state 
constitutional provisions, nor can those who might wish to bear arms in 
locations currently off-limits under federal law, such as airports, schools, 
courthouses, and perhaps other public buildings.  I am not taking issue 
with any of these restrictions but, rather, simply pointing out that they 
limit the constitutional choices available to state supreme courts 
interpreting state constitutional provisions recognizing gun rights. 
Thus, in the context of gun rights, the Second Amendment is not the 
end of the federal story; rather, it is just the beginning.  So long as this 
“right” remains heavily and validly regulated by Congress and the 
federal government, states will have less power to interpret their state 
constitutional gun-rights provisions broadly.  State supreme courts may 
interpret their state constitutions to provide greater protections for gun 
rights, but only if such expanded protections do not conflict with any 
requirements of federal statutes or regulations.  Because of the 
Supremacy Clause, state constitutions cannot override federal laws 
restricting the possession, use, and sale of firearms.92 
Ultimately, the gun-rights situation is another fascinating illustration 
of dual sovereignty, an interesting and enlightening example of the 
interaction between federal and state law in the area of personal liberties.  
The Second Amendment will preclude all governments—federal, state, 
and local—from banning handgun possession or use in general and from 
compelling citizens to render ordinary and common weapons such as 
rifles and shotguns inoperable or ineffective in their own homes.  But the 
Second Amendment right is far from absolute, and indeed the Supreme 
Court appears to have gone out of its way in Heller to bless the 
constitutionality of dozens of federal statutes regulating firearm 
possession, use, and transactions.93 
Even though the Supreme Court has in a real sense “federalized” the 
area of gun rights by giving some life and meaning to the Second 
Amendment, the Court at the same time has made clear that significant 
federal regulation of gun rights—regulation that is not speculative but 
already exists in the form of numerous federal statutes—does not violate 
the Second Amendment.94  Because of the Supremacy Clause and 
existing federal statutory regulation in this area, states are not necessarily 
                                                     
 91. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 94. See id. 
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at liberty to recognize expansive gun rights in their state constitutions.95  
Or, perhaps more precisely, even if states were to recognize broader 
individual rights to possess and use firearms, such recognition may be 
rendered ineffective by the preemptive operation of federal statutory and 
regulatory law.  For example, although states might deem it lawful for 
citizens to carry weapons in locations such as airports, federal law may 
preclude giving effect to those state preferences.  In such a situation, it is 
not that the Second Amendment itself limits the states’ options.  Rather, 
it is the limited scope of Second Amendment rights combined with 
preemptive federal legislative and administrative regulation of firearms 
that precludes giving effect to an expansive recognition of gun rights 
under state constitutions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the full scope, nature, and legal bases for an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms will be determined only after considerable 
legal “dialogue” that will occur in the federal and state courts, in 
Congress, in the state legislatures, and in local government bodies.96  
That is a familiar result under the American system of dual sovereignty, 
and it is perhaps one of the reasons why we continue to resolve our 
differences over important topics such as gun rights through public 
debate, legislative and executive policy initiatives, and litigation in our 
courts rather than resorting to violence or other unlawful means.  An 
ongoing public dialogue about important issues of individual rights is a 
necessary result of a system in which both the U.S. Constitution and the 
                                                     
 95. The McDonald plurality expressly recognized that incorporation of Second Amendment 
rights against the states “will to some extent limit the legislative freedom of the States, but this is 
always true when a Bill of Rights provision is incorporated.  Incorporation always restricts 
experimentation and local variations, but that has not stopped the Court from incorporating virtually 
every other provision of the Bill of Rights.”  McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) 
(plurality opinion).  Unlike with the Second Amendment, there are not dozens of federal statutes 
directly regulating the individual liberties guaranteed in most Bill of Rights provisions.  Thus, the 
real restriction on the states in the Second Amendment context may not be incorporation of that 
provision against the states but rather the federal statutory and regulatory scheme that governs 
firearms and preempts any state constitutional provisions or interpretations that conflict with federal 
law. 
 96. In this regard, good lawyers will be those prepared to argue both federal and state 
constitutional law on behalf of their clients.  See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Speech, Why Teach—and Why 
Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 178 (2009) (“What is important is 
that no lawyer worth his or her salt can be a good advocate in today’s world without appreciating the 
possibility—and value—of raising state and federal claims in representing a client. . . . A lawyer 
cannot do that today without understanding state constitutional law and appreciating its significance 
in modern individual-rights disputes.”). 
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state constitutions exist to protect the rights of citizens.  That the 
dialogue may at times be wonderfully complex, or perhaps maddeningly 
so, and that it may last for years, decades, or perhaps never end, are 
inherent and probably salutary features of the uniquely American system 
of dual sovereignty. 
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V. APPENDIX 
Table 1: State Constitutional Gun-Rights Provisions 
State Constitutional Provision Citation Comment 
Alabama “That every citizen has a right 
to bear arms in defense of 
himself and the state.” 
ALA. CONST. 
art. I, § 26. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Alaska “A well-regulated militia 
being necessary to the security 
of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.  The 
individual right to keep and 
bear arms shall not be denied 
or infringed . . . .” 
ALASKA 







Arizona “The right of the individual 
citizen to bear arms in defense 
of himself or the state shall 
not be impaired, but nothing 
in this section shall be 
construed as authorizing 
individuals or corporations to 
organize, maintain, or employ 
an armed body of men.” 
ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 26. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Arkansas “The citizens of this State 
shall have the right to keep 
and bear arms, for their 
common defense.” 
ARK. CONST. 




California NO PROVISION   
Colorado “The right of no person to 
keep and bear arms in defense 
of his home, person and 
property, or in aid of the civil 
power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall be called in 
question; but nothing herein 
contained shall be construed 
to justify the practice of 
carrying concealed weapons.” 
COLO. CONST. 
art. II, § 13. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
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Connecticut “Every citizen has a right to 
bear arms in defense of 
himself and the state.” 
CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 15. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Delaware “A person has the right to 
keep and bear arms for the 
defense of self, family, home 
and State, and for hunting and 
recreational use.” 
DEL. CONST. 
art. I, § 20. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Florida “The right of the people to 
keep and bear arms in defense 
of themselves and of the 
lawful authority of the state 
shall not be infringed, except 
that the manner of bearing 
arms may be regulated by 
law.” 
FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 8(a). 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Georgia “The right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not 
be infringed, but the General 
Assembly shall have power to 
prescribe the manner in which 
arms may be borne.” 
GA. CONST. 







Hawaii “A well regulated militia 
being necessary to the security 
of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.” 
HAW. CONST. 
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Idaho “The people have the right to 
keep and bear arms, which 
right shall not be abridged; 
but this provision shall not 
prevent the passage of laws to 
govern the carrying of 
weapons concealed on the 
person nor prevent the 
passage of legislation 
providing minimum 
sentences . . . nor prevent the 
passage of legislation 
providing penalties for the 
possession of firearms by a 
convicted felon . . . .” 
IDAHO CONST. 







Illinois “Subject only to the police 
power, the right of the 
individual citizen to keep and 
bear arms shall not be 
infringed.”  
ILL. CONST. 







Indiana “The people shall have a right 
to bear arms, for the defense 
of themselves and the State.” 
IND. CONST. 
art. I, § 32. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Iowa NO PROVISION   
Kansas “A person has the right to 
keep and bear arms for the 
defense of self, family, home 
and state, for lawful hunting 
and recreational use, and for 
any other lawful 
purpose . . . .”  
KAN. CONST. 
Bill of Rights 
§ 4. 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 
well as other 
non-militia uses 
Kentucky “All men . . . have certain 
inherent and inalienable 
rights . . . [including] . . . [t]he 
right to bear arms in defense 
of themselves and of the State, 
subject to the power of the 
General Assembly to enact 
laws to prevent persons from 
carrying concealed weapons.” 
KY. CONST. 
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Louisiana “The right of each citizen to 
keep and bear arms shall not 
be abridged, but this provision 
shall not prevent the passage 
of laws to prohibit the 
carrying of weapons 
concealed on the person.” 
LA. CONST. 







Maine “Every citizen has a right to 
keep and bear arms and this 
right shall never be 
questioned.”   
ME. CONST. 







Maryland NO PROVISION   
Massachusetts “The people have a right to 
keep and bear arms for the 
common defence.  And as, in 
time of peace, armies are 
dangerous to liberty, they 
ought not to be maintained 
without the consent of the 
legislature.” 
MASS. CONST. 





Michigan “Every person has a right to 
keep and bear arms for the 
defense of himself and the 
state.”  
MICH. CONST. 
art. I, § 6. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Minnesota NO PROVISION   
Mississippi “The right of every citizen to 
keep and bear arms in defense 
of his home, person, or 
property, or in aid of the civil 
power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall not be called 
in question, but the legislature 
may regulate or forbid 
carrying concealed weapons.” 
MISS. CONST. 
art. III, § 12. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
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Missouri “That the right of every 
citizen to keep and bear arms 
in defense of his home, person 
and property, or when 
lawfully summoned in aid of 
the civil power, shall not be 
questioned; but this shall not 
justify the wearing of 
concealed weapons.” 
MO. CONST. 
art. I, § 23. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Montana “The right of any person to 
keep and bear arms in defense 
of his own home, person, and 
property, or in aid of the civil 
power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall not be called 
in question, but nothing herein 
contained shall be held to 
permit the carrying of 
concealed weapons.” 
MONT. 




Nebraska “All persons . . . have certain 
inherent and inalienable 
rights; among these . . . the 
right to keep and bear arms 
for security or defense of self, 
family, home, and others, and 
for lawful common defense, 
hunting, recreational use, and 
all other lawful purposes, and 
such rights shall not be denied 
or infringed by the state . . . .” 
NEB. CONST. 
art. I, § 1. 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 
well as other 
non-militia uses 
Nevada “Every citizen has the right to 
keep and bear arms for 
security and defense, for 
lawful hunting and 
recreational use and for other 
lawful purposes.” 
NEV. CONST. 
art. I, § 11(1). 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 




“All persons have the right to 
keep and bear arms in defense 
of themselves, their families, 
their property and the state.”  
N.H. CONST. 
pt. I, art. 2-a. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
New Jersey NO PROVISION   
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New Mexico “No law shall abridge the 
right of the citizen to keep and 
bear arms for security and 
defense, for lawful hunting 
and recreational use and for 
other lawful purposes, but 
nothing herein shall be held to 
permit the carrying of 
concealed weapons.” 
N.M. CONST. 
art. II, § 6. 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 
well as other 
non-militia uses 
New York NO PROVISION   
North 
Carolina 
“A well regulated militia 
being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed . . . .” 
N.C. CONST. 





North Dakota “All individuals . . . have 
certain inalienable rights, 
among which are . . . to keep 
and bear arms for the defense 
of their person, family, 
property, and the state, and for 
lawful hunting, recreational, 
and other lawful purposes, 
which shall not be infringed.”  
N.D. CONST. 
art. I, § 1. 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 
well as other 
non-militia uses 
Ohio “The people have the right to 
bear arms for their defense 
and security; but standing 
armies, in time of peace, are 
dangerous to liberty, and shall 
not be kept up; and the 
military shall be in strict 
subordination to the civil 
power.” 
OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 4. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
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Oklahoma “The right of a citizen to keep 
and bear arms in defense of 
his home, person, or property, 
or in aid of the civil power, 
when thereunto legally 
summoned, shall never be 
prohibited; but nothing herein 
contained shall prevent the 
Legislature from regulating 
the carrying of weapons.”  
OKLA. CONST. 
art. II, § 26. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Oregon “The people shall have the 
right to bear arms for the 
defence (sic) of themselves, 
and the State, but the Military 
shall be kept in strict 
subordination to the civil 
power[.]” 
OR. CONST. 
art. I, § 27. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Pennsylvania “The right of the citizens to 
bear arms in defence of 
themselves and the State shall 
not be questioned.” 
PA. CONST. 
art. I, § 21. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Rhode Island “The right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not 
be infringed.” 
R.I. CONST. 









“A well regulated militia 
being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.  As, in 
times of peace, armies are 
dangerous to liberty, they 
shall not be maintained 
without the consent of the 
General Assembly.” 
S.C. CONST. 




South Dakota “The right of the citizens to 
bear arms of defense of 
themselves and the state shall 
not be denied.” 
S.D. CONST. 
art. VI, § 24. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
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Tennessee “That the citizens of this State 
have a right to keep and to 
bear arms for their common 
defense; but the Legislature 
shall have power, by law, to 
regulate the wearing of arms 
with a view to prevent crime.” 
TENN. CONST. 




Texas “Every citizen shall have the 
right to keep and bear arms in 
the lawful defense of himself 
or the State; but the 
Legislature shall have power, 
by law, to regulate the 
wearing of arms, with the 
view to prevent crime.”  
TEX. CONST. 
art. I, § 23. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Utah “The individual right of the 
people to keep and bear arms 
for security and defense of 
self, family, others, property, 
or the state, as well as for 
other lawful purposes shall 
not be infringed; but nothing 
herein shall prevent the 
Legislature from defining the 
lawful use of arms.” 
UTAH CONST. 
art. I, § 6. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
Vermont “That the people have a right 
to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the State—
and as standing armies in the 
time of peace are dangerous to 
liberty, they ought not to be 
kept up; and that the military 
should be kept under strict 
subordination to and governed 
by the civil power.”  
VT. CONST. 
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Virginia “That a well regulated militia, 
composed of the body of the 
people, trained to arms, is the 
proper, natural, and safe 
defense of a free state, 
therefore, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed . . . .” 
VA. CONST. 







Washington “The right of the individual 
citizen to bear arms in defense 
of himself, or the state, shall 
not be impaired, but nothing 
in this section shall be 
construed as authorizing 
individuals or corporations to 
organize, maintain or employ 
an armed body of men.” 
WASH. 




West Virginia “A person has the right to 
keep and bear arms for the 
defense of self, family, home 
and state, and for lawful 
hunting and recreational use.” 
W. VA. 
CONST. art. 
III, § 22. 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 
well as other 
non-militia uses 
Wisconsin “The people have the right to 
keep and bear arms for 
security, defense, hunting, 
recreation or any other lawful 
purpose.” 
WIS. CONST. 
art. I, § 25. 
Self-defense 
right explicit, as 
well as other 
non-militia uses 
 
Wyoming “The right of the citizens to 
bear arms in defense of 
themselves and of the state 
shall not be denied.” 
WYO. CONST. 
art. I, § 24. 
Self-defense 
right explicit 
 
